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DANIEL PRESS"

Local Environmental Policy Capacity:
A Framework for Research
ABSTRACT
Environmentalprotection at the sub-statelevel varies substantially.
This paperproposes aframework for explainingvariation in local
environmental policy outcomes. The analysis proceeds in three
parts. The first part briefly reviews some of the literatureon state
and local policy variations,noting how researcherstend to overlook
local policy patterns and that most studies focus exclusively on
policy outputs as opposed to outcomes. Parttwo develops a concept
of policy capacity that can fruitfully guide longitudinaland crosssectionalstudies of local environmental protectionactivities in the
United States. Part three draws attention to local environmental
policy outputs and outcomes in Californiaas an illustrativeexample
of the policy capacity framework, showing that environmental
protection policies and collective actions vary substantiallyfrom
county to county in ways that can be capturedby the indicatorsof
local policy capacity.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental protection varies substantially from community to
community. Some cities, counties, or regions consistently mobilize mass
support for habitat, beach, or neighborhood clean-up programs, municipal
recycling, open-space preservation, and water conservation. This paper sets
out a framework for explaining variation in local environmental policy
outcomes (i.e., the physical or biological effects of public policies). The
analysis proceeds in three parts. The first part of the article reviews some
of the literature on state and local policy variations, noting how researchers
tend to overlook local policy patterns and that most studies focus
exclusively on policy outputs, such as regulations, programs, or ordinances,
as opposed to outcomes. Studies of local policy outputs and outcomes,
particularly in the environmental policy arena, have thus been few and far
between, and theoretical development has been lagging. The second part of
the article develops a concept of policy capacity (a community's ability to
define and respond to problems) that can fruitfully guide longitudinal and
* Daniel Press is an Assistant Professor in the Environmental Studies Department at
the University of California, Santa Cruz. He can be reached at: dpress@cats.ucsc.edu. The
author wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora
Haynes Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency (R 825226-01-0), and the University
of California, Santa Cruz, Social Sciences Division.
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cross-sectional studies of local environmental protection activities in the
United States. Finally, the article draws attention to local environmental
policy outputs and outcomes in California to show that environmental
protection policies and collective actions vary substantially from county to
county in ways that can be captured by the indicators of local policy
capacity. This paper does not, however, test the policy capacity model with
a full-fledged analysis.
PART I: CURRENT LITERATURE ON STATE AND LOCAL POLICY
VARIATION
A. Studies of Environmental Protection Outcomes and Outputs
Political scientists have long been interested in state and local policy

variations in general,' and state environmental policy in particular.2 Understanding why some local governments mount considerably more comprehensive social or environmental programs than others is important for
ensuring equitable access to these benefits for citizens living in different
communities. There are also opportunities for policymakers and scholars to
learn how innovations arising in some local governments diffuse to others.
However, by asking why local public policy varies, many researchers limit
themselves to explaining differences in policy outputs (regulations,
programs) or expenditures, rather than performance or outcomes.3
Comparative policy output studies grapple with age-old questions about
the importance of socioeconomic (e.g., per capita income) versus political
factors in explaining policy outputs,4 or whether structural versus

1. For reviews of earlier studies, see George A. Boyne, Local Government Structure and
Performance: Lessons from America?, 70 Pus. ADMIN. 333 (1992); George A. Boyne, Review
Article: Theory, Methodology and Results in Political Science- The Case of Output Studies, 15 BR.
J.POL Sci. 473 (1985) [hereinafter Boyne, Output Studies]; Paul Brace & Aubrey Jewett, Field
Essay: The State ofState Politics Research, 48 POL RES Q. 643 (1995); L J.SHAMR& K NEWTON,
DOES POLU'cs MATrrE? THE DETERMINANTs OF PUBUCPOUCY (1984); Ann OM. Bowman &
Richard C. Kearney, Dimensions ofState Government Capability, 41 W. POL. Q. 341 (1988); Tom
W. Rice & Anthony F. Sumberg, Civic Culture and Government Performance in the
American States (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Jeffrey M. Stonecash,
The State Politics Literature: Moving Beyond Covariation Studies and Pursuing Politics, 28 POLYY
559(1996).
2. For reviews of earlier studies, see James P. Lester & Emmett N. Lombard, The
Comparative Analysis ofState Environmental Policy, 30 NAT. REs. J.301 (1990).
3. SHARM &NEWTON, supra note 1, at 171.
4. Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A
Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 831 (1961); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, The Relative
Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variablesfor PublicPolicy, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 559
(1977); Boyne, Output Studies, supra note 1.
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institutional factors are more responsible for policies.5 Mazmanian and
Sabatier propose a multivariate model of policy making that focuses on
policy outputs, specifically, decisions taken by coastal commissioners in
California on controversial coastal zone development projects.6 Their model
assessed the value of structural (institutions and their statutes or other legal
decisions), socio-economic, and attitudinal factors on policy outputs. 7 More
recently, Feiock and West tested competing explanations for the adoption
of municipal curbside recycling programs! They examined seven different
models, ranging from economic to political and administrative variables.
The authors conclude that municipalities are most likely to adopt curbside
recycling programs if they suffer a severe shortage of landfill space, or if
they face strong state mandates (and funding) for recycling programs, and
if their communities have relatively high fiscal revenues.9 The seven models
included 1) need (e.g., declining landfill space), 2) diffusion of innovation
(lessons learned from other jurisdictions), 3) political institutions (form of
government, mayoral veto power, district election system), 4) federalism
(e.g., patterns of state mandated programs), 5) economic wealth (fiscal
capacity), 6) interest group influence, and 7) administrative capacity (e.g.,
solid waste management, staff professionalism).0
The few studies that do focus on environmental protection
outcomes," and not just policy outputs, tend to be integrative in that they
use explanatory models that rely on both socioeconomic and political
variables. For example, Ringquist integrated political-economic

5. EVANJ. RINGQUisr, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECON AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS AND
PROGRES IN CONTROLuNG POLLuTION, 80-103 (1993); DO NSTFIONS MATTER? GOVEMENT
CAPABILmra INTHE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, eds.,

1993).
6. Daniel A. Mazmanian & Paul A. Sabatier, A Multivariate Model of Public PolicyMaking, 24 AM. J.POL. SC!. 439 (1980).
7. Id. at 442.
8. Richard C. Feiock & Jonathan P. West, Testing Competing Explanationsfor Policy
Adoption: Municipal Solid Waste Recycling Programs46 POL. Res, Q. 399 (1993).
9. Id. at 414-15.
10. Id. at 400-03.
11. In the environmental context outcomes refer to observable physical, behavioral, and

biological indicators. These include, but are not limited to:
A. Measures of activity of agencies or other actors: number of permits
issued, number of inspections completed, number and types of control
devices installed;
B. Measures of emissions or discharges into air or water;
C. Ambient levels of some pollutants (ozone in air, heavy metals in water);
D. Measures of human and/or wildlife exposure to contaminants;
E. Direct measures of human health/ecosystem integrity: blood lead levels,
lake acidity, species diversity.
DANIEL J.FIORINO, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 215 (1995).
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characteristics (wealth, political ideology), group influence (organized
interests), and political system characteristics (i.e., professional legislature)
to examine variations in state air and water quality. 2 Ringquist
purposefully sought to understand how these political and economic
variables affected not only the decisions adopted by state environmental
policy makers, but also how state air and water quality improved or
degraded as a function of those decisions. 3 He found that economic wealth
is not a dominant factor in either air or water quality regulation, and that
strong regulatory programs did make a difference in controlling air
pollution (and water pollution, to a lesser extent).
Folz and Hazlett seek to test whether successful recycling programs
are equally effective "... . in other communities located in different regions,
whose population vary in size, socioeconomic composition, political culture,
and form of government."' 5 One of their dependent variables is waste
diversion, thereby allowing them to measure an environmental outcome
more directly. The authors find that socioeconomic and political factors are
relatively unimportant. What explained the variation in successful recycling
efforts from city to city ". . .were the specific recycling policies adopted, the
process by which communities made these policy decisions, and other
features related to the program's operation." 6
Studies measuring policy outputs rather than environmental
protection performance in some specified geographic area are predisposed
to attributing great importance to official government agents and their
resources, administrative agencies, city managers, state legislators,
governors, and budgets, because these policy makers are the most visibly
responsible for policy outputs, for example, as sponsors of legislation. 7 If,
instead, researchers wish to explain variation in the totality of
environmental protection outcomes, their theoretical conceptualizations
need to ascribe greater importance to non-governmental actors, whether
they work independently of, or in partnership with, official government.'8
Mass behavior and policy support are crucial to the effectiveness of
environmental policy. For example, recycling programs will not work if

12. RNGQqsr, supra note 5, at 88-93.
13. For example, to measure the air quality variable, Ringquist uses "percent change in
state pollutant emissions, 1973-75 to 1985-87." Id. at 129-30.
14. Id. at 193-94.
15. David H. Folz & Joseph M. Hazlett, PublicParticipationand Recycling Performance:
Explaining ProgramSuccess 51 Pus. ADMIN. REv. 526 (1991).
16. Id. at 531.
17. See Boyne, Output Studies, supra note 1.
18. Martin Janicke, The Political System's Capacityfor Environmental Policy, in NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POuCIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CAPAcrrY-BUIDING 1,2 (Martin Janicke
& Helmut Weidner eds., 1997).
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people refuse to participate in curbside pick-up programs; and open-space
preservation will depend principally on state and federal funding if local
residents refuse to pay for special property tax assessments and bond
measures, or are unwilling to donate money or land to local land trusts."
A handful of other studies focus on both policy outputs and
environmental outcomes." These studies suggest that a combination of
official government action, socioeconomic factors, and social trust all affect
environmental protection activities at the local level. Studying the relative
contributions of each of these factors requires that researchers integrate the
factors traditionally used to explain policy outputs, socioeconomic and
political variables, with political behavior and social capital characteristics.2'
Thus, explaining environmental protection outcomes requires that
scholars broaden the set of explanatory variables to include individual
participation as well as mass political behavior, and their relationship to
policy. Participation studies are particularly useful for this task to the extent
that they examine not just the individual-level effects of participation, but
also the policy consequences of varying kinds and degrees of participation.'
B. Variations in Environmental Performance at the Local Level
Until recently, the attributes of civil society were usually left out of
any explanation for policy outcomes. That is, it is reasonable to assume that,
since voter turnout is low, especially in local elections, and political
pressure is best applied by organized, resourceful interests, ordinary
citizens have little influence over public policy. However, recent works
focusing on the roles that social capital and civic culture play in shaping
political institutions suggest that latent civic behavior, attitudes toward
society, and historical patterns of expectations for institutional performance
can exert surprisingly important influence on political, and even economic

19. Another reason to study environmental outcomes is to assess whether public policy
and/or mass behavior are positively affecting environmental change, and if so, how. Is
regulation successful? Does volunteer activity have an appreciable impact on environmental
quality? How susceptible are many environmental problems to resolution by public efforts
at changing private behavior?
20. For a brief summary, see Evan J.Ringquist et al, Evaluatingthe Environmental Effects
ofAgriculturalPolicy: The Soil Bank the CRP, and Airborne ParticulateConcentrations, 23 POL'Y

STUD. J.519 (1995).
21.

See ROBERT D. PurNAM, MAKING DEMOCRAcY WORK: Civic TRADmONS IN MODERN

ITALY 83-91 (1993).
22. Jan E. Leighley, Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political
Participation,48 POL. RES. Q. 181,196 (1995).
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outcomes.73 This literature suggests, in effect, that communities most
supportive of collective goals are those that have the highest levels of
political participation, the greatest memberships in organized groups
(Rotary Club, PTA, team sports, churches), the most citizens volunteering
for charitable purposes on a regular basis or lending a hand during natural
disasters, and that inspire their residents to feel the most social trust in their
neighbors and representatives.
These characteristics have long been associated with strong
citizenship and democracy. When he visited the United States in the early
nineteenth century Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by how strongly
Americans felt about their communities and how civic-minded they were
as a people. He stressed that these attributes made American democracy
both meaningful and effective.24
Although civic associations have been transformed since de
Tocqueville's day, they are still important and pervasive in many societies.
Putnam, drawing on both the American and Italian contexts, argues that
these associations affect individuals, by reinforcing habits of cooperation,
solidarity, and public-spiritedness.' Civic associations also have effects on
the polity as a whole by improving the effectiveness of interest articulation
and aggregation. 26 Thus, an active associational life can lead to high levels
of civic engagement, which, in turn, contributes strongly to successful
governance at the local level.'
Since Robert Putnam published his provocative essay "Bowling
Alone: America's Declining Social Capital,"' 2 there has been a vigorous
debate about the patterns of social capital in the United States. Putnam
argued that people turn out to vote less than they used to, are less likely to
join the PTA or the Rotary Club, and that social trust, in each other and in

23. PUTNAM, supra note 21, at 86-120; Rice & Sumberg, supranote 1, at 15-17; Dietlind
Stolle & Thomas R. Rochon, Social Capital,but how??? Associations and the Creation of Social
Capital 1-3 (March 1996) (paper presented for presentation at the Conference for
Europeanists, on file with author).
24. ALEXiS DE TOCQuEViLLE, DEMOCRACY INAMECA, Vol. 11., 118 (Philips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Vintage Books 1945).
25. PUTNAM, supra note 21, at 181-85.
26. Id. at 89.
27. Robert D. Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearanceof Social Capital
in America, 28 PS: POL. Sc. & POL. 664 (1995). Here social capital refers to the " ... features
of social life-networks, norms, and trust-that enable participants to act together more
effectively to pursue shared objectives." Id. at 664-65. I also include the concept of civic
engagement, whether manifested through traditional measures of political participation
(voting, party activity) or civic voluntarism.
28. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital,6 J.DEMOCRACY
65(1995).
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government, has also declined since World War II 9 Rosenstone and
Hansen had previously shown that political participation, mobilization, and
civic engagement have all declined precipitously in the United States since
World War I. Moreover, even though forms of participation that require
financial contributions are quite common, those that require commitment
of time are on the decline.' Ladd32 is just one of many commentators and
scholars who have offered evidence countering Putnam's, concluding that
most of the manifestations of social capital, including membership in
associations, volunteering, and voter turnout, have oscillated but are on the
rise in recent years. 33
Regardless of whose perspective prevails, the majority of social
capital studies use data aggregated at the national level; occasionally the
state level is also used.' Data on civic engagement and associational life are
based on national surveys taken over the last 30-40 years.' These data are
appropriate for marking the patterns of change throughout American
society, however, they cannot be used to distinguish between communities
at far smaller scales. Indeed, the premise of the policy capacity framework
is that local political cultures and institutional performance vary
tremendously in the United States, suggesting that researchers may learn
a great deal about participatory democracy if they change their scale, units
of analysis, and resolution to a sub-national, sub-state level. Thus, one need
not settle the question about the rise or decline of social capital to justify
using the concept at the local level.
Until the last decade or so, however, sociologists and political
scientists have downplayed the relevance of local politics, perhaps
overstating the homogenizing effects of national systems of education, mass
media, and big government?' This trend is being reversed, especially in
policy studies whose object of attention is services and outputs in general,
and policy variation in particular.37 Studying local outputs permits a wealth
of comparisons unavailable to national or area studies, and comparative

29. Putnam, supranote 27, at 666-67.
30.

STEVEN J. RosENsroNE & JOHN MAR

HANSN, MoBiuZATIoN, PARTICIPATION, AND

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 38-160 (1993).
31. SDNEo VERBA rAL., VOC AND EQuALrY: CIcVoLUNTAMusMINAMmucANPOLmCS
67-68(1995).

32.

Everett C. Ladd, The DataJust Don't Show Erosion of America's "Social Capital," THE

PusuC PESPEcIVI, June/July 1996, at 1.

33.

Id. at 5-22.

34.
35.
36.

See Rice & Sumberg, supra note 1, at 10-15.
Putnam, supra note 27,666-67.
John Urry, Conclusion: Place and Policies, in PLACE, POLICY, AND PO.Mcs: Do

LoCAUTIEs MATER? 187 (Michael Harloe et al., eds., 1990).
37. SHARP & NEWTON, supra note 1, at 1.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

studies of environmental policy outputs and protection activities are
becoming more common and sophisticated."*
M points out that local government in the United Kingdom
Agnew"
and the United States is sufficiently autonomous and differentiated that a
focus on place, whether a political jurisdiction or specific community, can
help construct persuasive explanations of variations in local policy
outputs.' For example, Sharpe and Newton observed that Welsh counties
distinguished themselves from English ones, with much higher per capita
spending on local government services. The authors argued that "cultural
differences" might be partly determinative of public policy, since these
patterns of spending" . . . could not be reduced entirely to such things as

class, politics, grants, sparsity, or the agricultural basis of the local
economy."41
Using measures of civic culture and government performance, Rice
and Sumberg found that states with highly developed civic cultures were
more likely to score highly on measures of government performance.4 2
Similarly, an exhaustive study of political participation, The Rebirth of
Urban Democracy, ' demonstrates that a focus on politics and associations
at the neighborhood level can yield rich, comparatively-based insights
about the nature of meaningful participation and the relationship between
a central policymaking authority (City Hall) and citizen interests." This
promise is echoed by Williams and Matheny: "by studying the ways in
which citizens respond to policies that impose significant costs and, less
frequently, benefits on their communities the investigator can clarify many
issues of participation and democracy obscured by a focus on national
policy-making."45
An important direction for this research agenda on civic
engagement and institutional performance is to explore whether a strong
civic culture raises the quality and pace of collective action across social

38.

See RINGQUISr, supra note 5, at 96-103; Ringquist et al., supra note 20; BRUCE A.

WILLIAMS & ALBERT R. MATHENY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES:
THE CONTESTED LANGUAGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION 10 (1995).
39. JOHN A. AGNEW, PLACE AND POLITICS: THE GEOGRAPHICAL MEDIATION OF STATE AND

SoCIETY (1987).
40. Id. at 56-57.
41. SHARME &NEWTON, supra note 1, at 172.
42. Rice & Sumberg, supranote 1,at 2-3,11. Rice and Sumberg measured civic culture
in terms of civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust and tolerance, and social
structures of cooperation (membership in professional societies, clubs, church groups). They
measured government performance as policy liberalism and innovation, and administrative
effectiveness.
43.

JEFFREY M. BERRY et al., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993).

44. Id. at 166-91.
45.

WiILLIAMS & MATHENY, supranote 38, at 10.
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issues, or manifests itself differently across issues and communities. In the
environmental arena, it is reasonable to expect that high levels of social
capital will translate into sustained collective efforts on behalf of
environmental protection. For example, citizens who become mobilized to
work on single-issue environmental problems often carry over their
participation into other policy arenas.4 In its 1994 survey of giving and
volunteering in the United States, the Independent Sector (IS) found that
respondents who reported contributing to environmental causes were far
more likely to be members of civic or voluntary associations, professional
societies, or political organizations.4 7
PART II. A THEORY OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
CAPACITY
A. Theory
A successful model of policy capacity for explanatory and heuristic
purposes should permit researchers to integrate all theoretically plausible
and reasonably obtainable independent variables, and to describe the
mechanism by which they affect environmental outcomes. The policy
capacity model is founded on the premise that some communities are more
capable of mounting environmental protection activities than others.
Environmental policy capacity is a community's ability to engage in
collective action that secures environmental public goods and services. The
model is integrative, relying on five components that each contribute to a
community's environmental problem-solving ability. The five components
are 1) social capital, 2) political leadership and commitment, 3) economic
resources, 4) administrative resources, and 5) environmental attitudes and
'behavior. Table 1 suggests indicators that could be used to measure
variation in each of these components.
Note the expansion in the term "policy:" instead of being limited to
"a course of governmental action or inaction in response to social problems"
that states a government's "intent to achieve certain goals and objectives
through a conscious choice of means, usually within some specified
period," 48 policy here refers, in effect, to a community's set of collective
choices and actions. An important element of policy capacity is a

46.

DANLPRES,

DEMocRATic DEMMAS IN THE AGE OF EcoLoGy: TREES AND TOxIc lN

THE AMERICAN WESr 93-94 (1994); ANDREW SZASZ, ECOPOPULISM: Toxic WASTE AND THE
MOvEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE 150 (1994).
47. 2 VIRGINIA A. HODGINSONETAL., GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES,

1994-90 (1995).
48. NORMANJ. VIG& MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL PoLIcY IN THE 1990S 5 (2d ed.
1994),
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community's ongoing posture toward, and its responses to, social problems
and opportunities. Such postures and responses can be captured in
measures of social capital, civic engagement, and environmentalism. In this
sense, policy is as much an orientation and an action agenda as it is a
decision formally taken by government agents.
The policy capacity concept goes beyond the political capacity or
capability terms usually used in political science research. Political scientists
usually mean either the capability of the state to deliver policy outputs that
raise and spend funds for given programs, or the particular intellectual and
psychological endowments of individual citizens (in their role as political
participants or potential participants). In the former category, for example,
Robertson and Judd define government policymaking capacity as" ... the
ability to entertain a variety of responses to social and economic problems,
to enact or reject authoritative solutions, and to implement its decisions."'
Bowman and Keamey, quoting Honadle, define capacity as "the ability to
anticipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about
policy; develop programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources;
manage resources; and evaluate current activities to guide future actions."51
In a recent volume, Weaver and Rockman refer to government capability
as "a pattern of government influence on its environment that produces
substantially similar outcomes across time and policy areas." 2 The specific
capabilities they assessed involved a government's ability to set and
maintain policy priorities, especially in the face of opposition by powerful,
organized interests. Highly capable governments, in Weaver and
Rockman's terms, could also effectively design and implement public
policies under conditions of political conflicts and cleavages.'
One definition that focuses on the competence of individual citizens
asserts that capacity is
the overall ability of an individual to take part in the political
process. This incorporates a practical dimension (the
knowledge necessary to know how to participate), a
psychological dimension (the belief that one can influence the
system), and an experiential dimension (the drawing of

49. DAVID B. ROBERTSON & DENNIS R. JUDD, THE DEvtswNT OF AMEmUCAN PUBLIC
POLICY: THE STRUCTURE OF POLcY RERIRNr 9 (1989).

50. Beth W. Honadle, Defining and Doing Capacity Building: Perspectives and Experiences,
in PER PRcnvEs oN MANAGEEr CAPACnm BUILDING 9-23 (Beth W. Honadle & Arnold M.

Howitt eds., 1986).
51. Bowman & Kearney, supra note 1, at 342.
52.

R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the Effects of Institutions, in DO

INSrIrtONS MATTER?, supra note 5, at 6.
53.

Id. at 6.
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lessons from activity in politics that makes one believe it is
worth participating again).54
Similarly, for Schneider and Ingran, capacity essentially refers to adequate
knowledge and fiscal resources (which can then translate into program
expenditures or staffing). For example, capacity-building policy tools
"provide information, training, education, and resources to enable
individuals, groups, or agencies to make decisions or carry out activities."I
The concept of policy capacity developed here relies on both types of
capability: that of government, in its execution of official duties, and that of
civil society, in its pursuit of collective action (whether perceived by
participants as political mobilization or not). As such, it is similar to the
concept of "capacity for environmental policy and management,"
developed by Jnicke.' In Janicke's model, governmental and nongovernmental actors, of varying competence and strengths, promote
environmental protection activities under three different frameworks: the
"cognitive-informational," the "political-institutional," and the "economictechnological.""7
To be useful to the study of politics and society, the policy capacity
concept must propose a mechanism by which the many factors listed in
table 1 come together to affect changes in outcomes. Figure 1 demonstrates
one such mechanism; to borrow from Leonardi, it illustrates the "systemic
logic" of the policy capacity concept.
In figure 1, local environmental policy capacity exists in a particular
setting (city, county, region) during a given time period (i.e., a particular
decade). The policy systems shaping collective environmental decisions, or
choices, are affected by three factors. The first consists of external constraints and opportunities, such as preexisting environmental conditions,
local private and public wealth or state and federal mandates, fundin& and
locally available expertise. The second factor is the local level of social
capital, which is composed of a community's social trust, civic engagement,

54. BERRY, supra note 43, at 257.
55. Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, Behaiioral Assumptions ofPolcy Tools, 52 J.POL 510,
517(1990).
56. Janicke, supra note 18, at 2.
57.

Id. at 8. "Cognitive-informational'

refers to knowledge and interpretation of

problems. Id. at 7. "Political-institutionalr refers to the institutions, rules, and norms
governing environmental policy. Id. "Economic-technological" refers to a nation's economic
and technological resources. Id.
58. Robert Leonardi, Regional Development in Italy: Social Capitaland the Mezzogiorno, 11
OXFORD REV. EcoN. POL'Y 165,171 (1995).
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Figure I The Systemic Logic of Policy Capacity

Social Capital

Collective Social Norms

External Policy Constraints
and Opportunities

Policy System

Policy Choices

Production of Collective Environment Outcomes
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and associational life." The final component of a local policy system is a
community's collective social norms. These are handed down as habits
(sorting curbside recycling, reduced water consumption), traditions,
legacies, and education.
Collective norms strongly influence the policy system composed of
formal political structures, such as county governments and city hall, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals. In the model of a
community with strong environmental policy capacity, the social norm is
to expect a high level of environmentally sound individual behavior and
institutional performance. Relatively high levels of social trust diminish
local concerns for free-rider problems. 6° Similarly, strong moral sanctions
may exist against free-ridership.
Policy constraints and opportunities also directly affect the policy
system, especially by changing the relationship between local desires and
local expectations. For example, local desire for growth management may
be tempered by low or heavily encumbered tax revenues or by state and
federal limitations on taxation (proposition 13)1 or land use restrictions
(U.S. Supreme Court takings cases).'
Finally, the policy capacity model suggests that when citizens place
high demands and expectations on the policy system, and provide the
political and moral rewards that support environmental protection, policy
makers and community leaders make environmentally-sensitive choices.
These choices produce collective environmental goods and services ("on the
ground" outcomes). Therefore, policy capacity in the environmental context
should be highest where:

59. Including voluntarism of different sorts- for a typology of voluntarism, see Ram A.
Cnaan & Laura Amrofell, Mapping Volunteer Activity, 23 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SEcTOR

Q. 335 (1994).
60. For example, creek clean-ups are intrinsically worthwhile activities whether many
or few local residents participate.
61. WILLIAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALMORNIA PLANNiNG 209 (1991). Proposition 13, passed
in 1978, was a constitutional amendment passed by initiative. "Proposition 13 rolled back
property tax assessments to 1975 levels, permitted an annual increase in assessment of only

2 percent except in the event of a sale, and, for all practical purposes, capped property-tax
rates at 1 percent per year. (A higher rate requires a two-thirds votes [sic], which is very
difficult to obtain). Since property tax rates at the time were approaching 2 percent in many
parts of the state, Proposition 13 cut local government revenues dramatically." Id.

62.

See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City of

Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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9 Community expectations of, and desire for, institutional
performance in environmental protection are high 63 (environmentalism);

9 Political leaders sustain a commitment to environmental
policy and programs;
* Community levels of social capital are relatively high; and
where
• Local budgetary, technical, and administrative resources
are relatively high (administrative and economic resources).
B. Local Environmental Policy Capacity Indicators
Table 1 displays these various elements of the policy capacity
concept as well as indicators available to measure variation in capacity.
Note that, unlike the state environmental capacity literature, this capacity
model relies on indicators of ability, not on indicators of performance.
Indicators such as legislative votes on environmental policy, the presence
or absence of various environmental ordinances, the extent of regulatory
enforcement, or patterns of water effluent releases are the measures of
policy outputs and outcomes.
If these are the elements of policy capacity and these factors
strongly shape policy outcomes, what are the observable implications of the
policy capacity concept? If the policy capacity concept is accurate, communities exhibiting relatively more social capital, and that have access to
relatively greater resources (either public or private, in terms of time,
expertise, or funding) should engage in greater local environmental
protection activities. It is unlikely that all five policy capacity components
will be highly present or unusually absent in any given community. Instead,
a community exhibiting strong environmental protection activities might
compensate for low levels of one component (e.g., public fiscal resources)
with high levels of another (e.g., political commitment, civic voluntarism in
environmental programs). Similarly, where general civic engagement and
social capital are low, one might expect environmental activism- as well as
mobilization against environmental protection- to be relatively absent. In
such a situation, political leadership, local revenues, and administrative
capabilities could be the principal components of environmental policy
capacity.
63. Institutions here include administrative agencies, elected policymakers, and
voluntary civic associations.
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Finally, the policy capacity framework allows researchers to
determine whether environmental attitudes or policies are bundled together
in any given community. Like most public policies, environmental policies
rely on a range of tools (command-and-control, market incentives) with
distinct approaches (regulatory, distributive, redistributive)." Similarly,
environmentalism, per se, does not stand for the same set of beliefs for all
citizens. How environmental values are bundled' and whether communities are successful at addressing a wide range of environmental problems,
are empirical questions, ones that can be explored by measuring many
kinds of environmental policy outputs and environmental attitudes at the
local level.
C. Indicators of Local Environmental Protection Outcomes
It is important to note that researchers now have access to far better
environmental protection data at the local level than were available as
recently as a decade ago. Various developments are responsible for this
improvement. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have been adopted
by many local governments (notably to keep track of land use and zoning),
landscape and community ecologists have begun systematically mapping
habitat and wetlands changes in most regions of the United States, and
many state or federal mandates require local data collection on numerous
environmental indicators.
Table 2 highlights the many types of local governmental and nongovernmental environmental protection activities now common in
California (and other western states). The right-hand column of table 2 also
lists indicators of environmental quality to accompany the programs
described to the left. Some indicators are certainly easier than others to
obtain. For example, data on good air quality days per year have been
collected by the local and regional air districts for over two decades, but
local patterns of voluntarism in environmental protection activities must be
painstakingly collected through case-study and survey research. Nonetheless, it is precisely the availability, variety, and quality of these data that
will allow researchers to make the crucial link between policy outputs and
environmental outcomes.

64. Command-and-control regulations dictate standards or allowable practices required
of some industries, for example, the requirement for scrubbers on smokestack power plants.
Market incentives are designed to change the economic incentives facing polluters, for
example by taxing emissions or offering subsidies for pollution abatement.
65. That is, whether concerns for very different problems (e.g., water quality and habitat
preservation) seem to occur together.
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Table 1. Environmental Policy Capacity. Categories and Indicators
Policy Capacity

Indicators

Economic and Administrative
Resources

• City or county per capita income
- County, city, special district budgets and expenditures (financial
transactions records)
* Local, regional, and state economic growth during time periods under
study
• Professionalism organizational structure, and size of administering
agencies; monitoring and enforcement personnel (whether governmental or
non-governmental)
. Number of county, city, special district professional or personal staff
* Accountability and information management through effective use of
Geographic Information Systems (e.&, for planning, management, and
dispute resolution purposes), and sunshine laws
Pundraising through grant proposals to state, federal, and private donors

Political variables"
* Elite values
Structure of the political
system

• Social characteristics (using interview/questionnaire responses)
• Formal powers of politicians
Elected/appointed posts ratio

* Elections

• Reformism
* Barriers to voting
* Voter turnout, partisanship
Social Capital
Primarily Individual-Level Survey
" Social Trust
• Social trust (group specific or generalized; bridging versus non-bridging)
" Cooperation and
• Non-political group membership, volunteering and charitable giving
Association
• Voting. campaign work, campaign contributions, contacts with
" Political Activity
government officials, protest, informal community activity, attending local
* Communty expectations for board meetings (or eightrhood assoiations), board or neighborhood
collective action
association membership, affiliation with political organizations, attending
meetings of political organizations
• Questions about expected levels of public goods and services, and about
who should provide them

Environmentalism

Attitudes and Behavior
" Results on environmental policy ballot initiatives
" Donations to environmental causes
" Survey results (opinion polls), including tests of priorities among
competing environmental values or issues
" Environmental education (funding , extent)
" Awareness of environmental issues, including perceptions of localized
environmental problems
• Number and nature of environmental groups (activity, size and
I composition of membership), e.g., land trusts

66. Boyne, Output Studies, supranote 1, at 485-89.
67. VERBA ET AL., supranote 31, at 54-58.
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Table 2. Indicators of Environmental Protection Policies and Outcomes at the Local Level in
California
Environmental Policies and Programs Indicators of Environmental Protection Outcomes

Environmental Regulations

' Water conservation, per capita urban water

consumption over time (e.g., during drought years)
* Extent and stringency of air and
water quality regulations (i.e., by
across counties
regional air districts and water quality 'Water use and wastewater flows (gals./day/per
control boards)
capita)
* Water conservation programs
' Dry weather storm drain discharges to navigable
' Existence and nature of local or
waters (gals./day)
regional environmental compacts
* Good air quality days (or number of stage I or 11
amne alerts ne vear
Energy and Materials Consumption
Programs
" Curbside pick-up of recyclables
" Local or regional Materials
Recycling Facilities (MRFs)
'Procurement policies

•Landfilled solid waste (tons/year and per capita)
, Solid waste diversions, reductions, recycling
•Years of local (usually county-level) landfill capacity
remaining
* Postconsumer recycled content of paper purchased
by local government (%)
Energy generated from renewable resources (%)
Zero- and low-emission vehicles in local government
fleets

Zoning and Land Use
Growth management ordinances
•Greenbelt elements in Master Plans
Conservation easements
'Open-space targets

•Open space and agricultural land in protected status
(total acres, acres/per capita, %of county)
- Greenspace to blackspace ratio (e.g., acres of parks to
parking lots or pervious to impervious surfaces)
' Prime agricultural and open space land lost to
development (acres/year)

Voluntary and Non-Governmental
Programs
* Adopt-a-creek, river, watershed,
park programs
"Coastal dean-up days
"Commuter ride-sharing progms

- Riparian ecosystem indicators (including degree and
kind of litter, obstruction, point-source effluents)
' Average Vehicle Ridership (AVR) or Vehicle Miles
Traveled (VM),
* Residential, commercial, and industrial energy
consumption
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The next section uses environmental programs and activities in California
to illustrate how the environmental policy capacity framework can capture
trends at the sub-state level.
PART III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CAPACITY IN CALIFORNIA 8
In the late 1990s the trend among federal and state policymakers is
to devolve federal authority and responsibility over numerous policy issues
from Washington to local and state governments. Environmental policy is
one of the fiercest arenas where this movement is being played out,
particularly in land use and conservation. "County supremacists" in
Nevada assert that counties are the rightful owners of federal lands, while
bioregionalists in northern California demand to have their say about
managing state and federal timberlands.' The choice to decentralize land
management and conservation to local and state governments has profound
consequences, few of which are explored, much less understood in the heat
of political debate.
Local governments and regions will differ tremendously with
respect to meeting these new challenges and opportunities. Environmental
protection activities in California provide an excellent example of local
variation, in terms of both environmental outcomes and their possible
determinants. For example, county-level voting data on California
statewide environmental ballot initiatives help demonstrate the degree of
local variations in support for environmental protection. Between 1924 and
1996,48 statewide propositions concerning environmental issues have been
placed on the ballot. These include parkland acquisition bond acts,
regulatory measures concerning coastal zone management, water quality
protection, toxic materials management, and wildlife habitat conservation.
My analysis of voting returns on these propositions shows that citizens in
California counties tend to vote consistently for or against environmental
propositions." Thus, local patterns of environmentalism, at least measured

68. This section's data on open-space land acquisition and voting patterns were
collected as part of the author's ongoing research project, Community and Conservation in
California. The databases are on file with the author.
69. Daniel Press, Environmental Regionalism and the Struggle for Calijbrnia, 8 SOC'Y & NAT.
REsoURCEs 289,294-97 (1995).

70. Two-thirds of the counties consistently (75% of the time) voted only above or below
the state average. More formally, chi-square analysis of county ballot approval yielded the
following result: G= 1074, df = 57, p < 0.001. The chi-square test measures the difference
between expected and observed outcomes. In this case, chi-square tells us that it is highly
unlikely that the large differences we see in average county approval of environmental
measures is due to chance. See supra note 68.
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by these electoral returns, are persistent over time and vary from county to
county.
California's large land area spans many distinct topographies,
settlement types, and cultural traditions, thereby further contributing to
local variations in policy outcomes. Its 58 counties are generally larger than
most counties east of the Rockies; thus, a handful of counties in California
often comprise entire watersheds or regions. Since approximately 1960, the
counties of California have faced identical state and federal environmental
mandates with few exceptions. Endangered species protection, air and
water quality regulations -even municipal waste reductions" -have
applied uniformly to all governments at and below the county level.
Budgetary shortfalls created by proposition 13, a highly mobile population,
and regional centers of culture and commerce imposed further uniformity
on the range of environmental policy options available to counties and other
local governments.
Despite these centralizing forces, local responses to development
and environmental degradation vary substantially, especially with respect
to land conservation and management.7 Indeed, local actors have imaginatively pursued land conservation through diverse, pragmatic strategies.
They have created special assessment districts to pay for regional park
authorities, and formed land trusts to purchase land or broker third-party
purchases. Local governments have created city and county parks and
greenbelts as well as sensitive habitat zones and timber preserves. Local
activists have often mobilized support for statewide ballot initiatives to
acquire critical local parcels. In many counties, landowners large and small
have bequeathed important parcels to the state park system, often thanks
to the encouragement of local civic and environmentalist leaders.
Cities, counties, and regions in the state also exercise substantial
influence on patterns of solid waste management, water and energy
consumption, and environmental restoration in their jurisdictions. Local
governments have some administrative autonomy over these policy areas
as well as different resources to devote to environmental protection.
The prevailing wisdom explaining local variation is that wealthier
communities are more able and likely to spend scarce private resources or
tax dollars on environmental amenities such as open space. Indeed, it makes
sense that wealthier people energetically support land acquisition and

71. The California Integrated Waste Management Act of 1989 requires each city, county,
and region in the state to divert 25% of its solid waste from landfills and transformation
facilities by 1995 and 50% by 2000. CAL. Pub. RES. CODE § 41780 (West 1997).
72. To be sure, in about a quarter of California's counties the federal government is a
major landowner (owning 50 to 90% of county land). These counties have less control over
local land uses than Central Valley and coastal counties. See supra note 68.
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zoning regulations that maintain the vistas that make their communities
desirable. Thus, per capita income should be strongly correlated with
locally protected open space acreage. However, in my sample of 47
California counties per capita income and protected acreage per thousand
residents were only somewhat correlated,,' and per capita income is only
a modest predictor of protected acreage per thousand residents.74 Therefore,
other factors must help account for this substantial variation.
Many public activities and services are now being carried out or
provided as partnerships between non-governmental organizations, loosely
organized citizens, and administrative agencies 7 From problem recognition
to policy formation, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring, the line
between official governance and voluntarism is becoming increasingly
blurred. In the last 15 years local residents have increased the roles they
play in managing their local environments.
There are now approximately 650 environmental groups in
California characterized as "non-profit corporation, non-governmental
organization, or citizen group." 76 The Land Trust Alliance lists 119 separate
land trusts in the state of California.7 To date there are some 400 Coordinated Resource Management and Planning programs (CRMPs), involving
private land owners, public-interest groups, and state or federal agencies

73. There are 58 counties in California. Excluding all counties with 60% or more federal
land (11 counties), and correlating per capita income with protected acreage per thousand
residents, the correlation is 0.476. That is, income accounts for approximately 20% of the
county-to-county variance in protected acreage. See supra note 68.
74. Adjusted R2 = 0.208, linear regression with log transformed variables. F-ratio = 13.08,
p = 0.001. Another reasonable assumption is that, as urban sprawl progresses, residents feel
motivated to contain growth through greenbelts, restrictive zoning, and relatively large open
space land acquisitions. A regression equation using urban density from the 1990 census
(percent of a county's population living in an urban area) and open space acreage shows
some relationship. However, the significance of the density factor disappears when
"environmental voting' (county average rate of approval of statewide environmental ballot
initiatives over the last four decades) is entered into the equation. See supra note 68.
75. See THE STATE OF PUBuC MANAGEMENr (Donald F. Kettl & H. Brinton Milward eds.,
1996).
76. HARBINGER COMMUNICATIONS, THE HARBINGER FLE: A DIRECTORY OF CITIZEN GROUPS,
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES & ENviRONmENTAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS CONCERNED wrH
CAUFORNIA ENviRONmNTAL ISSUES (1996); CALFORNiA INST. OF PUBLC AFFAIRS, THE
CALIFORNIA HANDBOOK: A COMPRE-mmVE GUIDE TO SOURCES OF CURRENT INFORMATION &

ACTION, (Thaddeus T. Trzyna, et al., 6th ed. 1993).
77. LAND TRUST ALuANcE, 1995 DIRECTORY OF CONSERVATiON LAND TRUSTS (1995).. The
Land Trust Alliance defines a land trust as "a local, state, or regional nonprofit organization
that directly protects land for its natural, recreational, scenic, historical, or productive
value." Id. at v.
78. Interview with Mark Nechodom, University of California, Davis, Division of
Environmental Studies, Santa Cruz, California (uly 22,1996).
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in land use decisions. They often operate at a watershed level to resolve
disputes over land use and development.
Up and down the California coast, non-governmental organizations
have implemented "Baykeeper," "DeltaKeeper," and "Sanctuary Watch"
programs to monitor polluting activities in the coastal zone and to serve as
extra eyes and ears for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Coast Guard, the state Coastal Commission, and the
regional water quality control boards." These groups regularly report to
administrative agencies that have official jurisdiction over activities in the
coastal zone, but are also understaffed or underfunded, and thus unable to
mount their preferred monitoring and enforcement programs. In a related
development, schools and civic organizations across the state have begun
to participate in Adopt-a-creek, -river, -watershed, -park, and -highway
activities. These activities involve hundreds of volunteers of all ages, though
especially of school-age children, in a combination of maintenance (i.e.,
clean-up), restoration," and natural history education.
Table 3 illustrates the range of local environmental outcomes in
three key issue areas, municipal solid waste diversions, water conservation,
and open-space preservation. While state and federal actors strongly
influence each of these areas, table 3 establishes that local differences occur.
Local and regional actors also have substantial discretion to affect these
issue areas, and thus local factors may strongly influence local environmental outcomes. For example, state solid waste diversion mandates require
that counties reduce the amount of waste they send to landfills, but they do
not specify how (i.e., through voluntary or mandatory recycling and waste
separation, public-private source reduction partnerships, or tiered tipping
fees). Water districts and companies across the state have similar autonomy
to implement conservation measures during periods of drought.

79. Dennis Rockstroh, Bay Navy Hunts Down Polluters,SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 1,
1996, at 1B; Trying to Keep the Delta Clean: Citizen Volunteers Look for Violations, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 31,1996, at 3B.
80. Restoration activities include controlling erosion, re-planting, and removing
invasive exotic vegetation. See A. D. BRADSHAW & M. J. CHADWICK, THE RESrORATION oF
LAND: THE ECOLOGY AND RECLAMATION OF DEREucr AND DEGRADED LAND 73-106 (1980).
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Table 3. Local Variation in Environmental Performance, California
Issue Area and Activity

Range of Variation

Level of analysis

Change in solid waste

-18% to 85%

County

- 8.5% to - 15.9%

Water district: varies from

diversions, 1990 - 1995 81
Per capita urban water
consumption change during

city to region levels

drought years (1987 1991)8 2
106,000 acres or 0 to

Open-space preservation

0 to

(through 1995)8

-200 acres/1000 residents

-

County

81. California Integrated Waste Management Board and California State Board of
Equalization. Data refer to change in percent solid waste diverted from landfills between
1990 and 1995, pursuant to a state-mandated reduction of 25%by 1995. A negative number
means that a county sent more-not less-waste to landfills in 1995 than it did in 1990. See
supra note 66.
82. LLoYD S. DIXON E"AL, THE EFFEcr OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY REDUCTIONS DuUNG

THE

1987-92 CALIFORNIA DROUGHT 19-20 (1995) (RAND PM-47-CUWA/CDWR).

83. Locally led preservation of open-space acreages. These include parcels greater than

10 acres acquired by municipal, county, or special district parks and recreation, open-space
agencies, or private land trusts. Figures also include local gifts of land to the state parks
system; otherwise, state and federal landholdings are excluded.
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CONCLUSION

The policy capacity framework is designed to study both crosssectional and longitudinal patterns of policy variation and environmental
outcomes. Longitudinal analyses are often far more difficult to conduct
because commensurable data are unavailable or because it is so difficult to
establish causal relationships over long periods of time. Nonetheless,
understanding environmental policy change requires an evolutionary,
historical perspective, because analytic results are so often timedependent. Adapting the policy capacity framework to longitudinal
analysis will require 1) gathering historic data commensurable with current
data, and 2) comparatively assessing preexisting environmental conditions
from community to community. For example, cities and counties in
California vary tremendously with respect to water availability, landfill
capacity, prime agricultural land, and airshed characteristics. Although
these may lie outside of the local policy capacity concept, "objective"
environmental conditions can sharply constrain local policymaking (e.g.,
water conservation in semi-arid lands) or provide unusual opportunities.
Policy capacity may increase even as local, state, and federal agents retreat
from various environmental policy responsibilities. Civil society will
sometimes step in to fill a previous role, or create new governance tasks
that, in turn, fall to non-governmental actors. But the gap left by official
government may not be filled equally well across a state, nor is it certain
that high levels of policy capacity and collective action can be sustained in
the absence of public funds or legal mandates. People may become tired of
volunteering, or they may find that they simply cannot consistently raise
adequate resources to meet the expectations of their communities.
Clearly, state and federal mandates will play important roles in
shaping local environmental outcomes. This article does not suggest that
local factors are more important, simply that, controlling for state and
federal mandates (that often affect counties and municipalities similarly),
local capacity factors can make a big difference in outcomes. Therefore, they
should be studied systematically and comparatively. Moreover, local
capacity itself can be shaped and encouraged by state and federal programs.85 Whether environmental policy capacity will increase or decline in

84. Lester & Lombard, supra note 2, at 316-18; Mazmanian & Sabatier, supra note 6, at
463.
85. For example, solid waste diversion grants from the state of California have been
awarded to non-governmental organizations, which, in turn, help develop waste
minimization practices for businesses in target counties.
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response to the withdrawal of state or federal programs remains to be seen,
and will make for valuable longitudinal analysis.
The environmental policy capacity framework provides researchers
with both integration and flexibility. The integration of the five policy
capacity components allows researchers to capture the whole range of
collective action efforts, not just governmental outputs. That can be
particularly valuable when, as is so often, the explanations that we have
ready indicators for (e.g., expenditures, political ideology) fail to persuasively suggest why and how environmental performance happened the way
it did. Similarly, there are multiple indicators for each set of capacity
components; thus, the policy capacity framework permits flexibility to
choose appropriate indicators depending on the particulars of different
communities and environmental policy arenas.
Local environmental collective action also serves as a good test of
democratic participation. By focusing not only on whether communities
vary, but also on how and by what social and political processes, researchers can learn a great deal about what is possible at the very smallest of
political jurisdictions.

